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This paper examines the relationship between securitization, the issuing bank’s overall exposure 
to risk and the response of the shareholder. Spanish securitization transactions are analyzed using 
event study methodology which reveals that securitization drains banks’ wealth, was most 
pernicious immediately prior to the subprime crisis and affects small and medium-sized banks 
most with respect to mortgage collateral transactions. The indirect effect of securitization on 
originator risk does not affect share value, while the direct effect gives a positive relationship. 
This effect becomes non-significant in the years prior to the crisis and the shareholders no longer 






Securitization really came to the fore in the USA in the 1990’s, and reached its zenith between 
the years 2000 and 2007. Faced with a fall in the relative volume of individual customer deposits, 
securitization became an important source of financing which, at least in part, provided a means 
of driving the expansion in credit activity. However, the rapid growth in securitization led to a 
series of risks which were propagated by certain key countries and eventually infected larger 
regions as was the case of the UK in Europe, the result being the destabilization of the economy 
as a whole (Morales and Andreosso-O’Callaghan, 2014). 
Various works1 have highlighted some of the aspects of securitization that might have been 
responsible for recent financial and economic instability: the lack of incentives on the part of the 
originators to control sufficiently high quality in collaterals, little transparency in securitization 
structures and lack of information with respect to the identification and localization of the real 
risks inherent in this type of operation. 
The securitization market in Spain has been characterized by a number of phases, the most recent 
of which saw Spain issue more securitization by volume than any other country in continental 
Europe by 2010 (54.9  billion €), and only exceeded in volume by the United States (1,276.7 
billion €) and the UK (102.6 billion €) world-wide. Securitization in Spain has become a key 
financial phenomenon which has significantly contributed to the capture of financing on the part 
of credit entities, both with respect to the economic and expansionary credit phases in capital 
markets and in the subsequent recessive phase, obtaining liquidity by means of operations carried 
out under the auspices of the Central European Bank.  
 The securitization market in Spain is characterised by its strict regulation and close links to the 
mortgage market. While Spanish legislation is similar to that of other countries, there are 
substantial differences when it comes to securitization. These differences are observable both with 
respect to the working securitization model and the relative of quality of the underlying assets. 
                                                          
1 Keys et al. (2010); Purnanandam (2011); Calmes and Téoret (2010); Fahri and Tirole (2009); Douglas and Raghuram (2009); Arce 
et al. (2012). 
The former is characterised by simple structures and aims to finance the credit entity rather than 
transfer risk, the so-called originate-to-hold model. The latter, the quality of the underlying assets, 
is generally believed to be high in Spain, even during the crisis years. The Spanish banking model 
is traditional and based upon a close relationship between the entities and their clients. This ethos 
has permeated securitization and means that the originator continues to carry out the role of 
administrator in nearly all securitization operations. Further, in Spain, the rates of retention for 
the first losses tranche are much greater than in other countries. In fact, in almost all securitizations 
the originator retains all of the first losses. 
This study sets out to empirically analyze the relationship between the securitization of credit risk, 
exposure to overall risk on the part of the issuing bank and the effects on the wealth of the banks’ 
shareholders in the Spanish market between 1995 and 2010. We aim to clarify the nature of the 
effects caused by the securitization of credit risk in the Spanish market via an analysis of the 
wealth effects experienced by the shareholders of the originator entities. By so doing we hope to 
improve our understanding of, and rekindle confidence in the process of securitization itself. 
The event analysis carried out demonstrates that the announcement of securitization transactions 
impacted negatively on the issuing bank’s share price. This might be due to the high risk 
reinvestment strategy adopted by Spanish banks and the retention of the highest risk first loss 
tranche. The analysis that uses subsamples gives a negative effect for share prices for the 2005 to 
June 2007 period, an effect which is non-significant in the 1995-2004 and July 2007-2010 periods. 
Securitization is an important event for small entities because, as is shown, the negative impact 
on share prices is significant for them, as are the negative effects in the case of mortgage backed 
securitizations. 
We believe that this work complements and enlarges upon other empirical studies in the field 
(Lockwood et al., 1996; Martínez-Solano et al. 2009; Thomas, 2001; Gasbarro et al., 2005; Franke 
and Krahnen, 2006; Hänsel and Krahnen, 2007; and Udhe et al. 2012), for various reasons. 
First, the study is innovative because it looks at the Spanish securitization market and adopts a 
very broad time-frame, 1995 to 2010 while including a large number of originator entities. This 
allows the analysis to study the market and extract conclusions by referring to different stages or 
phases of activity, one of slow growth up until the end of the 1990’s followed by a period of 
spectacular growth until mid 2007, followed by a phase of profound economic crisis. In addition, 
the peculiarities of the Spanish securitization market, in contrast with other markets (legislative 
differences, simple and traditional securitization structures, traditional banking model2 and the 
high level of retention in the first-loss tranche3) enables this work to reveal important aspects of 
the relationship between financial and market frictions and the way in which the originator is 
willing to assume risk. We divide the sample according to the size of the originator entity and 
type of collateral. Our results are in line with those obtained for other countries. 
Second, in order to reveal the significance of the abnormal stock return, the analysis includes 
additional tests which, until now, have not been implemented in studies of securitization. These 
tests are the alternative proposed by Chen et al (2011) to the BMP test established by Boehmer et 
al (1991) and the cross-sectional variance–adjusted version of the T3 test developed by Corrado 
(1989). 
Further, in the cross-sectional analysis we incorporate both the direct and indirect effects on 
aggregate returns. As far as we know, our study is the first that both proposes and applies a 
measurement of the direct and indirect effects of securitization on the risk to the originator and, 
specifically, on how this affects the price of the shares of the issuing entity. 
The rest of the work is set out as follows: section two provides a review of the existing literature; 
there is then a description of the data base used and the methodology utilized, after which the 
results of the econometric analysis are given and interpreted. The final section includes the main 
conclusions. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
                                                          
2 In this regard, the regulation of the mortgage market has played a key role in mortgage bonds (participaciones hipotecarias). This 
legislation establishes that the administration of mortgage loans must be kept in the hands of the original banking entity. The 
importance of the mortgage market in Spain, and the fact that this market first used securitization, has contributed to the dynamic via 
which the administration and custody of non-mortgage securitization loans are carried out by the original issuing entities. 
3 Securitization is a mechanism that facilitates the stratification of credit risk. The bonds are issued in different series with a specific 
subordinate structure. In the lower part of this structure are the series containing the lowest credit quality products, the equity tranche, 
which is normally retained by the issuer in order to provide the required credit enhancement level to the higher tranches, “mezzanine” 
and “senior”. 
Securitization is a financial operation that makes it possible to transform a series of illiquid assets 
into a series of bonds which are then placed in the market (securitization bonds) and are 
guaranteed by a series of predetermined payment flows. At the same time, securitization is a 
mechanism for transferring risk. 
When an entity carries out securitization, its exposure to risk is affected both directly and 
indirectly. The direct effect refers to the amount of risk which is transferred to the market. Some 
studies indicate that there is a reduction in global risk when the tail risk in the senior tranches 
outweighs the default risk in the first loss tranches - hence there occurs a transfer of risk from the 
issuing entity to the investors - (Jiangli et al. 2007; Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008). Other studies show 
that the major part of the default risk remains in the first loss tranche, which is retained on the 
bank’s balance sheet as a sign of credit quality for the investors (Riddiough 1997; DeMarzo 2005; 
Instefjord 2005). The Basilea I framework, which was in vigour until 2003, provided an incentive 
for the banks to transfer the loans which had the lowest levels of risk and maintain those with the 
highest levels in their portfolios within the first loss tranche. This would allow them to take 
advantage of the benefits of securitization in order to improve the status of their regulatory capital 
(Merton 1995; Calem and Lacour-Litle 2003); given that for Basilea I the capital requirements 
were lower than for Basilea II (Allen y Gale 2006). 
The indirect effect of securitization on the risk of the issuing entity is determined by the strategy 
adopted by this entity in the reinvestment of the liquidity obtained from the securitization. This 
effect depends upon the investment policy adhered to and is defined by how the risk in the bank’s 
portfolio is transformed (Leland 2007). In this sense, the reinvestment process might give rise to 
improved diversification on the entity’s balance sheet if investment takes place in new assets 
which are largely uncorrelated to the rest of the assets within the portfolio (Greembaum and 
Thakor, 1987; Carlstrom and Samoluk, 1995; and Gorton and Pennachi, 1995). In contrast, the 
effect of securitization on the financial stability of the entity depends on the level of risk of the 
new assets which, in turn and to a large extent, is determined by the levels of competition in the 
market (Instefjord 2005). Hence, if the liquidity generated via the securitization process is used 
in order to increase the amount of total assets, or with the aim of repurchasing shares or paying a 
higher dividend, this might generate even greater leverage, and thus weaken the financial stability 
of the entity (Shin 2009; Leland 2007; Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004). 
We focus on how shareholders can anticipate the effects of the securitization of credit risk. By 
reviewing the relevant literature, it may be seen that the economic benefits derived from 
securitization certainly do exist. There is a plethora of reasons that lead the banks to carry out 
securitization. Three of the most important are as follows: 
i. The volume of requisite regulatory capital is lower (Merton 1995) 
ii. It serves to administer the bank’s financing and liquidity (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987; 
Rosenthal and Ocampo, 1988; and Leland, 2007) 
iii. It reduces the bank’s overall exposure to risk by specifying and diversifying the credit 
portfolio (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Carlstrom and Samolyk, 1995; and Duffie, 2007). 
With respect to reasons i and ii the authors describe two of the most widely accepted benefits of 
securitization, so there is a tacit assumption that shareholders can anticipate the announcement, 
and take advantage of a higher ex-post share price. 
With respect to reason iii there is no real agreement with respect to the relationship between the 
exposure to overall risk experienced by the originator and the value for shareholders. Hence, there 
is a negative reaction in share prices to announcements of securitization if the shareholders 
anticipate that the originator retains the first loss tranche as a sign of quality for the investors. The 
wealth of bank shareholders is also likely to decrease if the shareholders expect a high risk 
reinvestment strategy. Reinvestment in low quality assets (e.g. granting higher risk loans) is more 
likely given that a change from the “originate to hold model” to “originate to distribute” might 
affect the banks’ incentives to monitor and screen. Finally, a negative reaction in terms of share 
prices should be expected if the shareholders anticipate that the financing derived from the 
securitization will be utilized to rebalance the structure of the issuing bank’s capital (e.g. via the 
repurchasing of its own stocks or by paying higher dividends) and thus creating even greater 
banking leverage. 
In contrast, a positive reaction in share prices is to be expected as a consequence of securitization 
when the shareholders anticipate that the tail risk in the senior and mezzanine tranches, which is 
transferred off balance sheet, exceeds the default risk of the first loss tranche. Similarly, the value 
for the bank shareholders is likely to increase if they expect the issuing bank to follow a 
conservative reinvestment strategy which results in greater diversification in its loans portfolio 
and a decrease in its rate of leverage. Hence, using funds to acquire new assets generates improved 
diversification in the bank’s assets portfolio if the resultant total assets are less closely correlated 
after the securitization. Equally, the reinvestment of funds in assets that are free from risk or 
which carry a reduction in liabilities, increases creditworthiness and decreases leverage. 
Therefore, the real effect of the bank’s overall exposure to risk depends on the way in which the 
risk contained in bank’s assets portfolio is restructured (Krahnen and Wilde, 2006), which, in 
turn, is determined by the level of competition in the assets market (Instefjord, 2005). 
One of the factors which influences how much risk banks are willing to take on board is the 
existence of financial friction within the markets. The literature suggests that the relationship 
between financial friction and the decision to take risks is positive (Osborne and Lee, 2001). It 
has been asserted that moral hazard and agency problems between bank managers and bank 
shareholders might generate incentives to assume risk, which would favour a climate of 
overinvestment on the part of the bank’s management (Stulz, 1990; and Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2002). Hence, financial frictions might lead to a lower perception of risk or an 
increase in risk tolerance on the part of the banks, resulting in greater financial fragility 
(Chortareas et al., 2011). 
With respect to market frictions, it has come to light that certain banking market structures (and 
in particular certain competitive market structures) might not be neutral from the point of view of 
financial stability (Delis et al., 2008; and Chortareas et al., 2011). Greater competition in banking 
markets together with a greater availability of credit might result in a pronounced fall in profit 
margins. This would probably encourage banks to soften their lending standards and, in so doing, 
increase their exposure to credit risk in order to fulfil capital market expectations (Peydrò and 
Maddaloni, 2010). Studies such as those of Chen et al. (2011), Jiangli et al. (2007) and Casu et 
al. (2010) reveal that the retention of risk in securitization operations varies according to the type 
of underlying asset. There is evidence that there is a significant negative effect with regard to 
assuming risk when it is mortgage backed loans that are being securitized. 
Empirical evidence as to the relationship between the securitization of credit risk and the 
shareholders´ wealth effects is ambiguous. For example, Lockwood et al. (1996) for the US 
market, provide evidence that there are abnormal negative returns for bank stocks around the date 
of the announcement of a securitization. Their analysis reveals that the wealth effect generated by 
securitization activity depends upon the pre-event financial soundness of the issuing bank. 
Thomas (2001), who also looks at the U.S. market, found that this scenario had a negative impact 
on the stock price of the issuing bank. Hence, this particular study reveals that securitization 
transactions tend to create losses for the shareholders, particularly when the capital markets are 
in tension or crisis. In contrast, Gasbarro et al. (2005) (US market) found that the announcement 
of a securitization transaction positively affects the issuing bank’s share prices. The evidence 
provided in this study further suggests that there are greater positive wealth effects for those banks 
with high financial leverage, low non-interest costs, and which issue securitization more 
frequently. Further, in contrast to the work of Lockwood et al. (1996) their study reveals that 
securitization provides greater shareholder value for the more highly leveraged entities. For the 
Spanish market, Martínez-Solano et al. (2009) show that there are significant, positive, abnormal 
profits on the day immediately after the announcement day and the reaction of the market is 
stronger when the announcements are made by banks with a higher proportion of equity in its 
capital structure and which are less profitable. Finally, Udhe et al. (2012) offer evidence of 
negative wealth effects for a sample of EU-15 plus Switzerland. 
As stated above, the object of this work is to analyze the relationship between the securitization 
of credit risk, the exposure of the issuing bank to the overall risk and the response of the 
shareholder. By so doing it is hoped the analysis will help to clarify the connection between 
financial frictions, market frictions and the willingness of banks to assume risk. In the Spanish 
market, the predominant securitization model has been originate-to-hold4 and, in this case, there 
is only a real transfer of risk when the final loss within the portfolio exceeds those in the first loss 
tranche. Hence, it is to be expected that there will be a negative reaction in terms of share prices 
when there is an increase in the levels of risk for the issuing entities. However, it should not be 
forgotten that the reinvestment of the new funds might purchase assets which are less closely 
correlated to the originator’s portfolio, thus improving diversification or, just the reverse, lower 
credit quality assets might be acquired. Therefore, securitization might have given rise to an 
increase in lower quality credit, particularly at the end of the credit boom. In addition to products 
of lower credit quality, securitization may well have helped to undermine the foundations of 
banking entities by increasing their levels of risk and reducing shareholder wealth. 
3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
3.1 DATA AND SOURCES 
The data base used in this study is made up of 185 issues of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
and asset-backed securities (ABS) carried out in Spain between the years 1995 and July 2010. 
The data was obtained from the web page of the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores 
(CNMV) (Securities and Exchange Commission), from the Spanish corporate loans market – The 
Association of Financial Asset Intermediaries (AIAF-initials in Spanish) –, and the existing 
Spanish assets securitization management companies’ web pages. The analysis also used the daily 
stock market quotes at the close of trading for 14 of the banks5 that had been the originators in 
the issue of securitization. This information was obtained from the Spanish Stock Markets and 
Exchanges web (Bolsas y Mercados Españoles (BME) – in Spanish). The data base used in this 
analysis contains 25 banks that have participated as issuing banks. However, close-of-trading 
                                                          
4 Among others, Fuentes (2007), Martín-Oliver and Saurina (2007), Catarineu and Pérez (2008) and Cardone, Samaniego and Trujillo 
(2010). 
5 The banks for whom viable stock market quotes were available were: Banco Español de Crédito, Banco Pastor, Bankinter, BBVA, 
Banco de Valencia, Banco Popular Español, Banco Sabadell, Banco Santander, Banco Guipuzcoano, Banco de Andalucía, Banco de 
Castilla, Banco de Galicia, Banco de Crédito Balear and Banco de Vasconia. Some of the Banks are quoted on the stock exchange 
according to the “Continuous Spanish Market” method, while some of the less liquid entities are aligned to the “Fixed System”. This 
might place a certain limitation on the analysis. 
prices were only available for those entities that have been quoted on the Spanish Stock 
Exchange6.  
The daily close of trading prices for the Ibex-35 index were used as an indicator of a portfolio of 
market stocks for the period analyzed. 
In addition, and as a means of better gauging the impact of the securitization of credit risk on bank 
shareholder value and, by doing, preventing any possible bias in the estimated results, 
securitization transactions are excluded if there were other types of relevant event during the event 
window. These events, which might have affected share prices, included: profit or dividend 
announcements, splits, announcements of share issues or the payment of dividends, mergers and 
suspended trading7. As a result, 23 securitization transactions were eliminated. 
Table 1 (in the Appendix) shows the characteristics of the definitive database which contains 162 
traditional securitizations with an average volume of 1,060 Million €, and a volume of 171,812 
Million €, corresponding to 14 quoted issuing banks. The most active of the issuing banks were 
BBVA with 30 securitization issues and 58,947 Million €, followed by Banco Santander with 18 
and 29,530 Million € and Bankinter with 23 and 24,232 Million €. These three banks issued the 
highest volume of securitizations and, together with Banco Popular and Banco Español de Crédito 
were responsible for 55% of all mortgage-backed operations. 
With regard to the distribution according to years, 56% of securitizations announcements occur 
in 2006, 2007 and 2008. The volume of securitization issued during these same years was even 
greater (66.20%). In short, both the number and the size of the issues were greater during this 
period. 
The distribution of the issues according to type of collateral reveals the relevance of mortgages 
in Spain since the presence of this kind of collateral was particularly strong during the period 
being analysed with the exception of the year 1996. Securitization using mortgage collateral 
                                                          
6 Since the savings banks are not quoted on the stock exchange it is not possible to obtain an indicator as to how their securitization 
activity is affecting systematic risk, even though it is an important proportion of all securitization in Spain. However, given the 
characteristics of these entities, and that little of their activity takes place outside Spain, there are good reasons to believe that the 
return of these entities is similar to that of the quoted banks.  
7 We did not take into account variations in the ratings of the issuing entities since the Spanish market is practically immune to these 
changes as Abad and Robles (2014) clearly demonstrate. 
represented 57% of securitization issues in Spain during the period. 39% of securitizations 
corresponded to collateral in business loans, securitizations which were concentrated in the period 
from 2006 to 2008. Consumer credit securitization made up the remaining 18%. On looking at 
the monthly distribution we find that there were issues throughout the year, although there were 
fewer of these in August and January, and more in May, June, September and October. 
We supplemented the data base with financial information for the originators obtained from 
Bankscope (Table 2 in Appendix). 
 
3.2. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
In line with Brown and Warner (1985), this analysis adopts standard event analysis to study the 
effect of securitization on the share value of the issuing bank. The aim of this approach was to 
gauge any reaction in share prices to announcements of securitization while at the same time 
taking into account abnormal stock returns on or around the date of the securitization. The 
abnormal return of a share (ARi,t) is held to be the difference between the observed stock return 
of the share (Ri,t) and the expected return when it is assumed that there has been no further price 
sensitive event (which in our case means that there was no securitization announcement). In short, 
it is the prediction error obtained using the standard market model in order to estimate the 
reference or expected return. Said model is as follows: 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑖 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
where Ri,t and Rm,t represent the daily returns on banks’ stock i and the market portfolio m at a 
trading day t, expressed in percentage points and obtained as a first difference of the logarithms 
of the prices of said stocks; εi,t is the error term and βi the coefficients of the regression. βi are 
estimated for a 201 day period which end five days before the event (issue announcement date, 
t0). The event window takes in 11 trading days on and around the date t0 which takes in the interval 
[-4, +6]. 
In accordance with the financial literature, it is common to encounter clusters of volatility when 
analyzing daily returns on banks’ stocks. Hence, in order to model the dynamic behaviour of the 
conditional variance of the error term, a GARCH (1,1) is adopted 
hi,t = α0,i + α1,iεi,t−1
2 + α2,ihi,t−1  (2) 
where hi,t = Var(εi,t It−1⁄ ) and It−1 represents the information available at time t-1. 
This specification is deemed necessary given the results that are contained in Table 3, which 
indicate the stationarity and leptokurtic distribution of the daily returns and the existence of first 
order autocorrelation in their squares and absolute values. Other works such as those of Matínez-
Solano et al, 2009 and Uhde et al, 2012 also incorporate volatility clusters. This procedure ensures 
that biased parametric and non-parametric tests and erroneous conclusions are avoided when 
testing the significance of abnormal returns. 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of bank stock returns 
Banks S K JB ADF Q(rt2) Q(|rt|) N. obs 
Banco de Andalucía  -0.4 24.3 65793.9*** -63.4*** 176.5*** 278.7*** 3489 
Banesto -0.9 27.2 72779.8*** -56.4*** 129.2*** 319.0*** 2977 
Bankinter 0.3 7.6 2525.5*** -50.7*** 271.3*** 227.1*** 2752 
BBVA 0.2 10.0 8157.9*** -58.5*** 185.7*** 367.9*** 3972 
Banco de Castilla 0.3 13.2 11832.0*** -34.1*** 318.8*** 225.7*** 2727 
Banco de Crédito Balear 0.2 18.5 27042.3*** -30.9*** 37.5*** 97.5*** 2702 
Banco de Galicia 0.4 14.1 13895.8*** -35.4*** 232.1*** 266.0*** 2700 
Banco Guipuzcoano 0.8 12.2 10802.6*** -58.6*** 122.0*** 240.5*** 2975 
Banco Pastor 0.3 8.6 3707.8*** -51.2*** 81.1*** 147.8*** 2765 
Banco Popular Español 0.1 10.5 7522.4*** -55.0*** 92.4*** 228.8*** 3213 
Banco Sabadell 0.6 13.4 9045.1*** -42.0*** 55.8*** 44.5*** 1981 
Banco Santander 0.4 13.7 16607.7*** -59.1*** 299.0*** 524.5*** 3462 
Banco de Valencia 0.5 9.3 2976.4*** -43.7*** 89.7*** 161.2*** 1733 
Banco de Vasconia 0.2 16.6 20328.8*** -58.3*** 298.5*** 279.5*** 2654 
Note: S is the Skewness and K the Kurtosis; JB denotes the Jarque-Bera normality test; ADF is the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
unit root test in which lags for the auxiliary equation are determined by Schwarz criterion; Q(rt
2) and Q(|rt|) are the Ljung-Box 
tests for the first order autocorrelation of the squares and the absolute values of the return respectively; ***indicates the rejection 
of null hypothesis at the 1% level. The data used corresponds to the period between January 1994 and October 2010. 
 
The mean and conditional variance (equations 1 and 2) are jointly estimated via maximum 
likelihood and a normal distribution of the error term, εi,t, is assumed. 
Table 4. Garch Effects 
 Median estimate 
(n=162) 
Significant coefficients at the 5% level 
(percentage) 
α0 0,19 56% 
α1 0,22 82,7% 
α2 0,61 74% 
Note: The model estimated by maximum likelihood is Ri,t = β0,i + β1,i Rm,t + εi,t 
with hi,t = α0,i + α1,iεi,t−1
2 + α2,ihi,t−1 assuming a normal distribution. We applied 
the Wilcoxon signed rank test to medians of estimated coefficients following a 
GARCH (1,1) process. A median that what significantly distinct from zero was 
obtained. 
 
As shown in Table 4, a high percentage of the GARCH(1,1) equation coefficients are statistically 
significant, which confirms the need for the modelling. Abnormal returns are calculated for each 
of the N securitizations, from this estimation as follows: 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − ?̂?0,𝑖 − ?̂?1,𝑖 𝑅𝑚,𝑡      (3) 
Average abnormal returns on day t would be 






   (4) 
Assuming that the abnormal returns of the shares are identically and independently distributed, 
the 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡 will be normally distributed. 
The cumulative average abnormal returns for the interval (t1, t2) is 
𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (𝑡1, 𝑡2) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
   (5) 
where (t1, t2) is any interval that belongs to the event window. 
In order to check the statistical significance of abnormal daily returns different types of parametric 
and non-parametric tests may be used. For parametric tests there are different kinds of testing 
procedures and this analysis uses two. The statistical significance tests used are the standardized 
cross-sectional test developed by Boehmer et al. (1991) (hereafter BMP). This test takes into 
account the possible cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and increases in the variance of abnormal 
stock returns during the event window, and a variant of the same test used by Chen et al. (2011) 
(hereafter BMP alt.). The BMP alt. test involves generating the standardized abnormal return by 
dividing the abnormal return by the standard error for the regression in the estimation period. 
For non-parametric analysis, both versions of the test developed by Corrado (1989) are used; the 
simple version – the T3 test– and the cross-sectional variance-adjusted version – T3 adj. test–. 
Both tests are consistent with respect to non-normality since they fail to establish a supposition 
in connection with the distribution of the returns, which means that they are valid for small sample 
sizes. 
Testing the significance of cumulated abnormal returns, in line with the work of Campbell et al. 
(2010) and Chen et al. (2011), the BMP test8 and the alternative Corrado T3 test are used9. 
The exogenous choice of the 11 day event window [-4;+6]10 is arbitrary given that there is an 
assumption that the reaction in share prices to the announcement of securitization totally reflects 
how the  securitization impacts on the value of the shares without bias within these 11 trading 
days. Nevertheless, it should not be completely ruled out that the 11 day period might accurately 
capture the information revealed in a securitization transaction. Therefore, since the market 
response might be incomplete or biased, we analyze the robustness of the result by estimating the 
cumulative abnormal return for various additional event windows [-4,+3], [-4,+1], [-1,+6], [0,+6], 
[+1,+6] and [+2,+3]. 
 
4. RESULTS 
The results for the whole of the sample, both with respect to each of the individual days for the 
event window and for the cumulative abnormal return, are given in Table 5. The data refers to an 
11 day trading window of [-4,+6] on or around the date t0 of the securitization announcement11; 
the index used was the Ibex-35. 
The results reflect that Spanish originating bank share prices react negatively to the announcement 
of securitization. This response is neither prior to nor immediately after the announcement, but 
occurs on day +2, as shown in 3 of the 4 tests that have been applied. The average of the abnormal 
returns for this day is -0.2507. 
Table 5. Wealth Effects around the Announcement Day 
                                                          
8 Additionally, we have calculated the tAB test put forward by Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) both for the ARs and the CARs. This test 
is a variant of the BMP test that aims to take into account the cross-sectional correlation of the abnormal returns and the volatility 
induced by the event. The significance of the ARs and CARs is the same as for the cases tested using BMP. 
9 These tests which are applied to different days are dependent by construction. However, the effect of ignoring the dependence should 
be negligible for short event windows. So these tests applied to multiple day windows make the assumption that the daily returns are 
independent. 
10 The analysis has been carried out for other windows of a different length [-5,+5] and [-6,+4]. The results will be made available to 
those interested. 
11 The results for other alternative windows are similar to those presented for the [-4,+6] window. 
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Window 










 ***, **, * indicates the significance of the tests with a probability of error of 1%, 5% and 
10%. The tests used are the parametric test proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991) and its 
alternative version (BMP and BMP Alt), and the non-parametric tests proposed by Corrado 
and Zivney (1992) (T3 and T3 adj.) 
 
On analyzing the mean of cumulative abnormal returns for different windows, it is found that, for 
window [-4,+1], none of the tests applied confirm the significance of an adverse effect on prices. 
However, the rest of the windows chosen and shown in Table 5 confirm the significance of the 
negative effect on prices. 
These results for the average of the cumulative abnormal returns reinforce those obtained for day 
+2 and confirm the inexistence of a negative effect prior to day +2 indicating the significance of 
said effect when the day +2 is introduced into the window. The average of the cumulative 
abnormal returns for the [-4,+6] window is -0.6980 whilst for window [-1,+6] the figure is -
0.6956; indicating that this latter window captures practically the whole of the effect. 
These results are consistent with other findings obtained by Lockwood et al. (1996), Thomas 
(2001) and Udhe et al. (2012) but differ from the results obtained in the only study that looks at 
the Spanish market which finds that there is a positive relationship that is detectable on the day 
following the securitization announcement. The empirical results show that bank shareholders 
cannot foresee a decrease in the Spanish originating banks’ overall exposure to risk as a result of 
the securitization of credit risk. With respect to theoretical arguments, the results suggest that the 
banks used in our sample managed to maintain most of the default risk within the first losses 
tranche and, in so doing, were able to transfer the smallest part of the credit risk off balance sheet 
-4 0.0118 -0.8803 -0.8831 -1.8756* -1.8441* 
-3 -0.0736 -1.1854 -1.1891 -1.3270 -1.4286 
-2 0.0594 1.1022 1.1042 1.0960 1.0468 
-1 -0.0150 -0.2546 -0.2655 0.1050 0.1655 
0 -0.0183 -0.6734 -0.6608 -0.3892 -0.3879 
+1 -0.0528 -0.6311 -0.6403 -0.3175 -0.4409 
+2 -0.2507 -1.9903** -1.9984** -1.5420 -1.6748* 
+3 -0.0351 -0.3063 -0.3007 -0.7389 -0.7304 
+4 -0.0273 -0.0513 -0.0594 -0.1470 -0.1457 
+5 -0.1589 -1.2367 -1.2468 -0.5844 -0.6371 
+6 -0.1375 -1.1017 -1.1078 -1.4617 -1.4292 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  BMP BMP Alt T3  
[-4,+6] -0,6980 -2,0903** -2,0903** -2,1656**  
[-4,+3] -0,3743 -1,7152* -1,7153* -1,7639*  
[-4,+1] -0,0885 -1,0178 -1,0178 -1,1057  
[-1,+6] -0,6956 -2,0037** -2,0037** -1,7945*  
[0,+6] -0,6806 -2,0962** -2,0963** -1,9581*  
[+1,+6] -0,6623 -1,9379* -1,9379* -1,9561*  
[+2,+3] -0,2858 -1,6852* -1,6852* -1,6128  
(direct effect). Spanish banks use this securitization strategy because, by maintaining the highest 
risk first losses tranche this is normally perceived by potential investors as a sign of quality. 
In addition to the effects that the direct impact of securitization announcements have on banks’ 
overall exposure to risk, a negative reaction might also be explained by the issuing bank’s 
investment policy and the decisions taken with respect to the structure of capital that results from 
securitization (indirect effect). In this sense, shareholders might expect a heavy risk reinvestment 
strategy and an ex-post redistribution of the capital structure that leads to lower creditworthiness 
for Spanish banks and an increase in the rate of bank leverage. 
In an attempt to clarify the origin of this negative wealth effect for the shareholders of the 
originator entities, we first carried out regressions for different subsamples and then realized a 
cross sectional analysis of market. 
 
4.1. Subsamples 
The sample was divided according to the type of transaction, type of collateral and the size of the 
issuing entity. In order to isolate the period of economic crisis and its effects, the sample was also 
divided into two periods; from 1995 to June 2007 and July 2007 to 2010. In addition, the 1995 to 
2007 period was subdivided: 1995 to 2004 and 2005 to June 2007. This was the first time a 
division into subsamples has been carried out for the Spanish market. 
 
4.1.1. Subsamples: 1995 to June 2007 and July 2007 to 2010 
On introducing the (1995 to June 2007) pre-crisis subsample and the (July 2007 to 2010) crisis 
subsample, Table 6 reveals that the negative effects on share prices are concentrated in the period 
prior to the crisis. The table also reveals that, subsequently, the negative effect is non-significant. 
This shows that there might be a return to lower risk transactions using traditional structures 
during the crisis period. It would seem therefore, that there was an attempt to reduce the risk 
inherent in the type of issues which, during the boom period for securitization, led to such 
complexity that even the foremost market analysts were unable to gauge the reach of these 
transactions. 
In addition to the +2 window, the average of the abnormal returns is significant for other one-day 
windows (-4, -3 and +6). On taking into account the cumulative abnormal returns, the cumulative 
effect in the [-4,+1] window is not significant and this confirms that the individual effect of the 
previous days (-4 and -3) is offset by those that follow. 
This result provides empirical evidence that the wealth effects arising from securitization activity 
in Spain depend on the time frame used both before and during the crisis. These results coincide 
with those obtained by Thomas (2001) for the American bank market. 
Table 6. Wealth Effects around the Announcement Day: Pre-crisis and Crisis 
  Pre-Crisis Crisis 
Event 
Window 




















-4 -0,0954 -1.7956* -1.7957* -2.1603** -2.1801** 0,1638 0.2247 0.2197 -0.2179 -0.7075 
-3 -0,1703 -1.7264* -1.7309* -1.3732 -1.7306* 0,0635 -0.0066 -0.0069 -0.3264 -0.4210 
-2 0,0666 1.5784 1.5746 1.0317 1.0239 0,0492 -0.1400 -0.1300 0.3832 0.2214 
-1 0,0312 0.0076 0.0113 -0.2088 -0.3035 -0,0805 -0.3509 -0.3669 0.3780 0.1111 
0 0,1577 0.7945 0.7999 0.9556 0.9278 -0,2679 -1.6760* -1.6610* -1.6026 -1.5917 
+1 -0,2231 -1.3455 -1.3512 -0.9696 -0.9153 0,1887 0.5079 0.5025 0.6329 0.3694 
+2 -0,4785 -2.2763** -2.2800** -1.3127 -1.2201 0,0722 -0.4885 -0.4919 -0.6932 -1.0823 
+3 -0,1103 -0.7718 -0.7623 -1.2397 -1.2382 0,0717 0.3373 0.3360 0.3453 0.1094 
+4 0,0389 0.2332 0.2304 0.0536 0.0536 -0,1211 -0.2249 -0.2324 -0.2644 -0.5856 
+5 0,0228 -0.3092 -0.3239 0.1560 0.3158 -0,4165 -1.3403 -1.3425 -0.9877 -1.3575 
+6 -0,2996 -2.0535** -2.0580** -2.1960** -2.0344** 0,0924 0.2233 0.2303 0.3987 -0.2263 
***, **, * indicates the significance of the tests with a probability of error of 1%, 5% and 10%.The tests used are the parametric 
test proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991) and its alternative version (BMP and BMP Alt), and non-parametric tests proposed by 
Corrado and Zivney (1992) (T3 and T3 adj.) 
The considerable length of the pre-crisis period combined with the intense growth in securitization 
in Spain between 2005 and 2007 has led us to subdivide this period into two: 1995 to 2004 and 
2005 to June 2007. Table 7 provides the results of these subsamples and confirms the presence of 
a significant negative wealth effect in the final period12. Therefore, shareholders would have been 
able to take advantage of the learning curve during the period of the sample (and in particular the 
final 2 years), thus making it possible to better take advantage of the impact of structured financial 
instruments and their inherent risk. If these assertions are correct, the negative response in share 
prices to securitization immediately prior to the sub-prime crisis in mid-2007, might have been a 
                                                          
12 It is interesting to note, as in this case, the significant negative wealth effect occurs on day +1 and that the [+2,+3] window is not 
significant, in contrast to the rest of the sub-samples with significant negative wealth effects. 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  BMP BMP Alt T3   𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  BMP BMP Alt T3  
[-4,+6] -1,0601 -2,3953** -2,4806** -2,1900**   -0,1846 -0,7743 -0,8545 -0,5891  
[-4,+3] -0,8221 -2,0285** -2,0622** -1,8657*   0,2607 -0,4797 -0,5144 -0,3891  
[-4,+1] -0,2333 -0,9584 -0,9880 -1,1123   0,1168 -0,5018 -0,5143 -0,3073  
[-1,+6] -0,8610 -2,0474** -2,1166** -1,6835*   -0,4611 -0,9111 -0,9995 -0,6339  
[0,+6] -0,8922 -2,2058** -2,2714** -1,7208*   -0,3805 -0,8929 -0,9802 -0,8205  
[+1,+6] -1,0499 -2,6651*** -2,7206*** -2,2488**   -0,1126 -0,3617 -0,4752 -0,2320  
[+2,+3] -0,5888 -2,4274** -2,4334** -1,8048*   0,1439 -0,1012 -0,1108 -0,2460  
consequence of growing uncertainty among shareholders with respect to the real impact of the 
securitization on the originator banks’ overall risk exposure. 
Table 7. Wealth Effects around the Announcement Day: 1995 to 2004 and 2005 to June 2007 
  1995 to 2004 2005 to June 2007 




















-4 0,1591 -0,0567 -0,0577 -0,3490 -0,3075 -0,3244 -2,5414** -2,5315** -2,6938*** -2,7763*** 
-3 -0,2476 -1,6320 -1,6365 -0,9901 -1,2103 -0,1008 -0,8643 -0,8665 -0,9446 -1,1948 
-2 -0,0757 0,6905 0,6865 0,1258 0,1652 0,1947 1,5956 1,5945 1,3272 1,2297 
-1 0,0101 -0,0696 -0,0684 -0,2527 -0,2987 0,0501 0,0797 0,0836 -0,0415 -0,0809 
0 0,1674 0,3851 0,3843 0,9332 0,8526 0,1490 0,7113 0,7188 0,4132 0,4373 
+1 -0,1635 -0,2582 -0,2581 0,6488 0,5196 -0,2768 -1,7829* -1,7922* -2,0138** -2,0160** 
+2 -0,6609 -1,6256 -1,6271 -1,2461 -1,1111 -0,3143 -1,6246 -1,6280 -0,6035 -0,6386 
+3 -0,2523 -1,1184 -1,1082 -0,4125 -0,4038 0,0174 -0,1130 -0,1088 -1,3338 -1,1143 
+4 -0,1418 -0,6565 -0,6560 -0,8347 -0,7758 0,2015 1,0244 1,0188 0,9096 0,8638 
+5 0,1282 0,1083 0,1010 0,5131 0,5674 -0,0722 -0,5398 -0,5510 -0,2930 -0,1334 
+6 -0,3135 -1,0764 -1,0780 -0,9376 -1,1510 -0,2871 -1,7468* -1,7509* -2,1559** -1,9430* 
***, **, * indicates the significance of the tests with a probability of error of 1%, 5% and 10%. The tests used are the 
parametric test proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991) and its alternative version (BMP and BMP Alt), and non-parametric 
tests proposed by Corrado and Zivney (1992) (T3 and T3 adj.) 
 
4.1.2. Subsamples: Small and large banks 
Two specific subsamples are created to control for the size of the bank. Small and medium sized 
banks are deemed to be those that have a total volume of assets which is less than or equal to 150 
Billion € and the large banks over 150 Billion €. The announcement of a securitization might be 
an important event for small and medium sized institutions but insignificant for large banks. 
On effecting this division, we find that the average estimated cumulative abnormal returns are 
only negative and significant for the small and medium sized banks. The securitization of credit 
risk might be capable of affecting the share prices of smaller banks but not those of large entities. 
As with the whole of the sample, the average cumulative abnormal returns in the [-4,+1] interval 
is not statistically significant whereas those for the [-1,+6] interval capture the greatest effect. 
Table 8. Wealth Effects around the Announcement Day: Small and Large Banks 
  Small Banks  Large Banks 
Event 
Window 


















-4 -0,0164 -0.8351 -0.8294 -2.3738** -2.2626** 0,0874 -0.3051 -0.3216 0.2563 0.1980 
-3 -0,0632 -0.9382 -0.9447 -1.0509 -1.2741 -0,1016 -0.7130 -0.7104 -0.9485 -0.9273 
-2 0,1360 1.3547 1.3562 1.3346 1.2237 -0,1461 -0.1165 -0.1150 -0.0555 -0.0528 
-1 -0,0372 -0.2262 -0.2420 0.1161 0.2131 0,0444 -0.1163 -0.1108 0.0159 0.0079 
0 -0,0524 -0.7292 -0.7173 -0.6497 -0.6553 0,0731 -0.0070 -0.0024 0.3355 0.4731 
+1 -0,0671 -0.2400 -0.2508 -0.0162 -0.2263 -0,0144 -0.9604 -0.9587 -0.6499 -0.6526 
+2 -0,2340 -2.0427** -2.0513** -1.5169 -1.6546 -0,2956 -0.5537 -0.5539 -0.5707 -0.6259 
+3 -0,0831 -0.5026 -0.4990 -1.1641 -1.1728 0,0937 0.2980 0.3036 0.5126 0.5232 
+4 0,0413 0.4546 0.4470 0.3013 0.2043 -0,2111 -1.2195 -1.2183 -0.8560 -0.8929 
+5 -0,1211 -0.9937 -0.9952 -0.4160 -0.5374 -0,2602 -0.7547 -0.7712 -0.5020 -0.4251 
+6 -0,0952 -0.8083 -0.8180 -1.6462* -1.5758 -0,2510 -0.8227 -0.8168 -0.1664 -0.1928 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  BMP BMP Alt     T3   𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  BMP BMP Alt T3  
[-4,+6] -1,3904 -1,5396 -1,5961 -0,8448   -0,7628 -1,8307* -1,8912* -2,2401**  
[-4,+3] -1,0633 -1,1587 -1,1780 -0,5454   -0,6051 -1,8015* -1,8368* -2,0826**  
[-4,+1] -0,1501 -0,2405 -0,2576 0,0473   -0,3082 -1,1488 -1,1848 -1,6139  
[-1,+6] -1,2262 -1,5635 -1,6069 -0,5616   -0,5323 -1,3313 -1,3898 -1,8097*  
[0,+6] -1,2363 -1,7047* -1,7315* -0,5049   -0,5825 -1,4258 -1,4929 -1,9189*  
[+1,+6] -1,4037 -2,2210** -2,2234** -0,9263   -0,7314 -1,6734* -1,7384* -2,2414**  
[+2,+3] -0,9132 -2,2831** -2,2859** -1,1728   -0,2969 -1,1638 -1,1695 -1,3698  
 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  BMP BMP Alt T3   𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  BMP BMP Alt T3  
[-4,+6] -0,5924 -1,5935 -1,6617* -2,1352**   -0,9813 -1,4142 -1,5287 -0,7926  
[-4,+3] -0,4173 -1,4042 -1,4555 -1,8812*   -0,2590 -1,0290 -1,0352 -0,3905  
[-4,+1] -0,1003 -0,6499 -0,6976 -1,0777   -0,0571 -0,9289 -0,9052 -0,4271  
[-1,+6] -0,6488 -1,6337 -1,7073* -1,7648*   -0,8210 -1,1554 -1,2404 -0,6651  
[0,+6] -0,6116 -1,6812* -1,7630* -1,9305*   -0,8655 -1,2584 -1,3314 -0,7170  
[+1,+6] -0,5592 -1,5062 -1,5999 -1,8200*   -0,9386 -1,2206 -1,2935 -0,9114  
***, **, * indicates the significance of the tests with a probability of error of 1%, 5% and 10%. The tests used are the 
parametric test proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991) and its alternative version (BMP and BMP Alt), and non-parametric 
tests proposed by Corrado and Zivney (1992) (T3 and T3 adj.) 
 
4.1.3. Subsamples: according to underlying asset; mortgages, business loans and consumer 
credit 
We analyze the impact of different types of underlying assets since the way in which bank share 
prices vary in response to securitization might be conditioned by the differences in nature of the 
risk in the reference portfolio and the residual loans portfolio (e.g. the degree of diversification, 
granularity and counterparty risk). 
As shown in Table 9, there is no unanimous agreement in the test results capable of affirming 
that, for individual days, there was a significant negative effect. In the case of cumulative 
abnormal returns, only the mortgage securitizations produce a significant negative effect for those 
windows that include the +2 day. These results lead to the conclusion that the impact of the 
underlying asset is conditioned by the difference between its risk and the credit risk in the residual 
loans portfolio. Mortgage loans make for highly granular portfolios which are characterised by a 
lack of diversification (Catarineu, Pérez, 2008). Therefore, a negative response in terms of share 
prices confirms the results obtained in this study given that the originator banks can transfer lower 
risk tranches whilst maintaining those that are riskier in the loans portfolio. 
Our results coincide with those of Chen et al. (2008) and Casu et al. (2011) who provide evidence 
that securitization has a negative impact on bank risk taking. They reveal that what exclusively 
determines this negative relationship is the securitization of mortgage loans and not by any other 
type of assets. They suggest that the net impact of securitization on originator banks and the way 
in which they approach risk taking might depend on the structure of the transaction and the fact 
that the securitization is used principally as yet another source of financing rather than an 
instrument of risk management. 
[+2,+3] -0,3171 -1,8757* -1,8828* -1,8957*   -0,2019 -0,2425 -0,2486 -0,0411  
 Table 9. Wealth Effects on or around the Announcement Day: mortgages, business and consumer loans 
 Mortgages Business Loans Consumer Credit 
Event 
Window 
𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅  
(n=69) 
BMP BMP Alt T3 T3adj. 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅  
(n=63) 
BMP BMP Alt T3 T3adj. 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅  
(n=30) 
BMP BMP Alt T3 T3adj. 
-4 0,2603 0.3650 0.3522 -1.0513 -0.5300 -0,1911 -1.4387 -1.4245 -1.8158* -1.7794* -0,1335 -0.9432 -0.9435 -0.1406 0.1351 
-3 -0,0906 -0.4809 -0.4809 -0.5994 -0.5782 -0,0002 -0.4955 -0.5002 -0.8887 -0.7563 -0,1890 -1.7396* -1.7414* -0.8711 -0.6191 
-2 0,1740 1.6959* 1.6933* 1.5902 1.6006 0,0121 0.0623 0.0664 -0.0084 -0.1056 -0,1046 -0.1556 -0.1529 0.3915 0.0359 
-1 -0,1878 -0.7266 -0.7368 -0.9176 -0.5894 0,0034 -0.5130 -0.5153 -0.2626 -0.2552 0,3437 1.4701 1.4736 1.8140* 1.8876* 
0 -0,1136 -0.4916 -0.4871 -0.2578 -0.2344 0,1693 0.0925 0.1075 -0.0439 -0.0607 -0,1932 -0.7485 -0.7489 -0.4687 -0.7404 
+1 -0,2520 -1.1890 -1.1901 -0.4487 -0.4466 0,2573 1.0499 1.0355 0.4813 0.4381 -0,2459 -1.1616 -1.1639 -0.8353 -0.9176 
+2 -0,3478 -1.4427 -1.4442 -1.3483 -1.2319 -0,1569 -1.3979 -1.4078 -0.4159 -0.4793 -0,2245 -0.4369 -0.4376 -1.0751 -1.4826 
+3 -0,2630 -1.5013 -1.4933 -1.2804 -1.2803 0,1966 0.9906 0.9919 0.6271 0.6827 0,0027 -0.2592 -0.2588 -0.9097 -0.7174 
+4 -0,2107 -1.0867 -1.1027 -0.7458 -0.4936 0,1504 0.8128 0.8173 0.0794 0.2063 0,0214 -0.1092 -0.1101 0.5238 0.4190 
+5 0,0530 -0.1430 -0.1494 0.5230 0.5948 -0,3027 -0.9965 -1.0077 -0.7897 -0.7745 -0,3445 -1.1441 -1.1404 -0.8188 -1.0295 
+6 -0,2611 -0.8693 -0.8687 -1.0725 -0.9307 -0,1991 -1.1421 -1.1510 -2.028** -1.7254* 0,2761 0.7030 0.7074 1.1248 1.0039 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  BMP BMP Alt T3  𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  BMP BMP Alt T3  𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  BMP BMP Alt T3  
[-4,+6] -1,2392 -1,7220* -1,7990* -1,6911*  -0,0609 -0,8080 -0,8882 -1,5275  -0,7912 -1,2028 -1,7135* -0,3815  
[-4,+3] -0,8205 -1,3061 -1,3266 -1,5251  0,2905 -0,4992 -0,5373 -0,8227  -0,7443 -1,3308 -1,3520 -0,7407  
[-4,+1] -0,2097 -0,3553 -0,3689 -0,6877  0,2508 -0,5460 -0,5525 -1,0362  -0,5225 -1,0982 -1,1346 -0,0450  
[-1,+6] -1,5829 -2,551** -2,596*** -1,9616**  0,1184 -0,3103 -0,3980 -0,8320  -0,3641 -0,7615 -0,7744 -0,2281  
[0,+6] -1,3951 -2,711*** -2,746*** -1,7502*  0,1149 -0,1761 -0,2904 -0,7902  -0,7078 -1,2736 -1,2726 -0,9294  
[+1,+6] -1,2815 -2,844*** -2,869*** -1,7852*  -0,0543 -0,2079 -0,3132 -0,8355  -0,5146 -0,9748 -0,9752 -0,8126  
[+2,+3] -0,6108 -2,671*** -2,686*** -1,8588*  0,0397 -0,1239 -0,1265 0,1493  -0,2218 -0,4946 -0,4983 -1,4035  
***, **, * indicates the significance of the tests with a probability of error of 1%, 5% and 10%. The tests used are the parametric test proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991) and its alternative version (BMP and BMP 
Alt), and non-parametric tests proposed by Corrado and Zivney (1992) (T3 and T3 adj.) 
4.2. Cross sectional analysis of market reaction 
The following cross-sectional analysis is carried out with the aim of clarifying the negative wealth 
effect.  
As seen earlier, the Spanish market reacted negatively when banks announced they intended to 
securitize during the 1995 to 2010 period and, more specifically, for the 2005 to 2007 sub-period. 
This reaction might be because the investors anticipate that the securitization will have negative 
effects on the banking institution’s solvency, profitability and liquidity. The market reaction could 
also depend on the extent of securitizations issued, the type of collateral, the precise moment the 
securitization is issued and, of course, on the modified risk to the entity derived from the direct 
and indirect effects of the securitization. 




     (6) 
where ρi, m is the lineal correlation coefficient between the asset’s return and that of the market; 
and σi and σm the standard deviation of the return of the share and the market respectively. 
The securitization announcement might gradually change the beta coefficient during and after the 
event window, and said change might be broken down into a) the change in the correlation of the 
bank’s return with that of the market portfolio (∆𝜌𝑖,𝑚 ) and b) the change in the relative deviation 




Therefore, the systematic risk after the event may be expressed as:  
𝛽𝑖










0 + ∆𝛽𝑖  (7) 
where the periods immediately prior and subsequent to the event window are termed 0 and 1. 
In order to take into account the change in beta, we moot the following model 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖,0 + 𝛽𝑖,1𝑅𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,2 
 (𝑇1 − 𝑡)(𝑡 − 𝑇2)𝐷1,𝑡
 𝑅𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,3[(𝑡 − 𝑇1)𝐷1,𝑡
 + (𝑇2 − 𝑇1)𝐷2,𝑡]𝑅𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
        (8) 
where Ri,t and Rm,t are the previously defined values, D1,t and D2,t are the dummy variables. D1,t 
takes a value of 1 if T1 ≤ t ≤ T2, and T1 and T2 represent the start and end of the window, and takes 
a value of 0 otherwise. D2,t takes a value of 1 if t > T2 and 0 for the rest; t is the date of the event. 
The event window or interval used is [-6, +6] days and the regressions are carried out using 241 
data symmetrically moving around the event day13.  
In order to carry out the breakdown of the change in the systematic risk, following Nijskens and 
Wagner (2011), it is necessary to normalize bank stock returns and market returns utilizing their 
respective standard deviations before and after the start of the event window. Once the return has 
been normalized, the modified model is estimated enabling us to estimate the change in 𝜌𝑖,𝑚: 
?̃?𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖,0 + 𝜌𝑖,1?̃?𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖,2 
 (𝑇1 − 𝑡)(𝑡 − 𝑇2)𝐷1,𝑡
 ?̃?𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖,3[(𝑡 − 𝑇1)𝐷1,𝑡
 + (𝑇2 − 𝑇1)𝐷2,𝑡]?̃?𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          
(9) 
 
?̃?𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 and ?̃?𝑖,𝑡   are daily normalized returns on the market portfolio and bank’s stocks. 





















0   (10) 
The variation in β reflects the changes in the entity’s systematic risk due to certain events such as 
the announcement of securitization. This is, therefore, an indicator of the effect of securitization 
as used in other studies such as those of Franke, Krahnen 2006; Hänsel, Krahnen 2007; Udhe, 
Michalak 2010 and Nijskens, Wagner 2011. The breakdown proposed allows us to quantify the 
direct effect by looking at the change in correlation between the share i and the market (∆𝜌𝑖,𝑚). 
A positive coefficient should be expected if securitization succeeds in transferring risk to the 
market. In addition, we use the change in the Relative standard deviation (∆REL_SD) as a 
measure for the indirect effect. The volatility in the bank’s portfolio is an indicator of the quality 
of same, hence the variation therein reflects the result of reinvestment of the flows of capital 
derived from securitization operations. An increase in volatility would have a negative effect on 
abnormal returns. 
With regard to the characteristics of the banks being considered, we use the Z-Score14 ratio as a 
proxy of the banks’ financial solvency (Michalak and Uhde, 2012, Battaglia and Mazzuca, 2011 
and Ben Salah and Fedhila, 2012). The variable is determined as follows: 
                                                          
13 [-6,+6] is the symmetrical window that most closely approximates to that used in our analysis. 
14 The Z-score indicates the number by which the standard deviation of the bank’s asset returns has to drop for the entity to become 
insolvent. In short, it is a measure of how far a bank’s asset returns must fall below their expected value before the institution’s equity 
is depleted and the bank becomes insolvent. 
𝑆𝑂𝐿 = 𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ≅
ROAA+𝐾
𝜎
  (11) 
The ROAA is the return on average assets before taxes, K is the equity as a percentage of total 
assets and 𝜎 is the standard deviation of the ROAA. We calculate the standard deviation of the 
ROAA for a rolling time window of three years. We expect a positive relationship between 
solvency and the CARs. The greater the Z-Score ratio the greater the margin between solvency 
and bankruptcy, hence it is logical to expect that increases in this ratio lead to increases in the 
CARs. 
The rest of the variables included are the liquidity ratio (LIQ), and the volume of securitization 
issued for each of the financial entities and for each year (SVOL)15. It should be expected that 
these factors affect CARs positively and negatively respectively. It is possible that those entities 
that experience financial instability more readily rely upon securitization to extricate themselves 
from this uncertainty and thus we would expect a negative coefficient for SVOL. An increase in 
liquidity is a sign of financial health and so we would expect a positive relationship with the 
CARs. 
Finally, in order to control for the type of collateral, we use the dummy variable DMORT that 
equals 1 for mortgage collaterals and 0 otherwise. 
To analyze the factors that may explain the abnormal returns we estimate the following cross-
sectional model.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1,6),𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑂𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼3∆𝜌𝑖 + 𝛼4∆𝑅𝐸𝐿_𝑆𝐷𝑖 + 𝛼5𝑆𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖 + 𝛼6𝐷𝑀𝑂𝑅𝑇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
(12) 
The estimation method used is Least Squares with White standard errors in those equations in 
which heteroskedasticity is detected. 
Table 10 shows the results of the estimations of different specifications of the equation (12)16. As 
explanatory variables regression (1) uses the CAR in the [-1,+6] window for the whole of the 
                                                          
15 Table 2 is given in the Appendix and gives all of the variables. 
16 Only the most relevant results are given, hence some of the variables given in table 2 do not appear. The bank’s net interest margin 
and impaired loans, for example, do not obtain significant results and are not given here. 
sample17, liquidity (LIQ), solvency (SOL), the volume of securitization (SVOL), and the two 
variables that take in the direct (ρ) and the indirect effects (REL_SD). It also includes the 
DMORT dummy variable which takes a value of 1 for mortgage collateral. The results show that 
only the ρ coefficient is positive and significant, which confirms the importance of the direct 
effect derived from the announcements of securitization on share prices and, as such, confirms 
the transfer of risk to the market. The effect of liquidity and the volume of securitization are also 
significant. Liquidity has a positive influence whilst the volume of securitization has a negative 
influence whose importance is negligible. The mortgage dummy variable is also significant and 
negative which indicates the relevance of mortgage collateral on share values. 
This result from regression 1 is maintained for regressions 2, 3 and 4 which progressively 
eliminate the solvency, liquidity and dummy mortgage variables, thus confirming the importance 
of the direct effect on share values and the non-significance of the indirect effect.  
Reducing the sample to the January 2005 to June 2007, regression 6 incorporates liquidity and 
solvency as explanatory variables. Both give a positive, significant effect which indicates that 
increases in liquidity and solvency are reflected in increases in the CAR during this period. This 
same regression for the total period (Regression 5) shows that the effects of these two variables 
are non-significant. Similarly, Regression 7 shows that the direct effect of securitization, ρ, is 
non-significant, as is the indirect effect REL_SD. This suggests that shareholders do not 
perceive a transfer of risk to the market as a consequence of securitization. Further, the 
reinvestment of the liquidity obtained and, more specifically, how this affects the bank’s final 
portfolio (which potentially impacts on diversification), is either not perceived by the investor or 
not held to be of importance. That is, shareholders do not observe a transfer of risk and fail to 
appreciate any change in risk indirectly. Therefore, the risk remains in the originator entity and it 
is normal that the effect of securitization on the CARs was both negative and significant. 
                                                          
17 In total, the sample contains 162 securitizations but when the variables that are relative to the banks’ characteristics are included, 
the sample size is reduced because of a lack of data pertaining to the year of securitization. 
On considering the whole of the sample of securitizations it may be observed that only the direct 
effect is significant. This shows that, in those securitization operations in which there is perceived 
to be greater transfer of risk to the market, there is also a greater wealth effect, which might mean 
that, on average, this is non-significant in some of the sub-periods. 
Our results substantially improve upon those of previous works in the field since they shed light 
on how the direct and indirect effects of securitization affect the issuing entity and the 
shareholders’ perception of the changing value of their shares. Further, in contrast to the work of 
Martínez-Solano (2009), our results for the liquidity and solvency variables are significant and 
take the expected signs. 
Table 10. Results of Cross-sectional analysis of cumulative abnormal returns 
Var. dep. 
iCAR ),6,1(  



















































    








  0.17 
(0.95) 








  1.16 
(0.18) 
Obs 141 154 162 162 141 50 50 
Adjust. R2  0.071 0.063 0.098 0.079 0.011 0.165 0.136 
        
        
Equations estimated for Least Squares using the White correction for the standard errors in those cases in which there 
is heteroskedasticity. P-values in brackets. ***, **, * indicates coefficients that are significant to 1%, 5% and 10% 




Using securitization transactions in the Spanish market from 1995 to 2010 and an event study 
methodology, it has been shown that there is empirical evidence that indicates that Spanish 
banking credit risk securitization announcements generate negative wealth effects for 
shareholders. This effect, in the analysis by sub-periods, is maintained between 2005 and June 
2007, but is insignificant between 1995 and 2004 and between July 2007 and 2010. 
This negative wealth effect is concentrated on the +2 day after the announcement of the 
securitization operation. The effect does not register prior to this day or immediately afterwards, 
but occurs on the second day after the announcement. 
This analysis shows that the negative wealth effect due to securitization activity in Spain depends 
on the juncture, and is concentrated the two years immediately prior to the subprime crisis. The 
analysis also shows that securitization operations are more highly relevant for the small and 
medium sized originator entities which register a significant negative wealth effect in contrast to 
the larger entities. Further, the securitized loan only produces a significant negative wealth effect 
in the case of mortgage collateral. This result demonstrates that the effects of the underlying asset 
are conditioned by the difference between the risk of the asset and the credit risk of the residual 
loans portfolio. Mortgage portfolios contain granular collateral which is relatively undiversified. 
This enables banks to transfer the lower risk tranches while retaining those that are high-risk. 
We find that liquidity, solvency and the volume of securitization significantly influences bank 
share prices. The first two of these have a positive influence. In contrast, the volume of 
securitization negatively affects share prices. 
Our results indicate that shareholders cannot anticipate a decrease in the overall risk-taking of 
Spanish issuing banks as the result of the securitization of credit risk. Shareholders perceive and 
value only the direct effect of securitization - not the indirect effect -, which has a positive, 
significant influence. However, this effect is not strong enough to compensate for the negative 
variation in prices. This might be because the originator banks in our sample retained the majority 
of their default risk in the first loss tranche as a sign of quality for investors. The direct effect 
loses its significance during the years immediately prior to the crisis, exacerbating the negative 
effect of securitization during this period. 
The conclusions obtained in this study are consistent with and substantially improve upon the 
empirical results of Lockwood et al. (1996) and Thomas (2001) for the U.S. bank market and 
upon the evidence provided by Franke and Krahnen (2006) for the European bank market (1999-
2002). Udhe et al. (2012) also provide empirical evidence that shows there are negative wealth 
effects caused by credit risk securitization which are time-dependent. Our results are consistent 
with most of the empirical literature on the subject, but are novel with respect to Spain and differ 
from those reported by Martinez-Solano et al. (2009) in which a positive wealth effect is recorded 
for the 1993-2004 period. Other studies such as Thomas (1999) and Higgins and Mason (2004) 
present positive effects. Thomas (2001) points out that the differences between studies come from 
the fact that the periods analyzed are different. 
This is the first time the wealth effect has been analysed for Spain using the type of collateral, the 
size of the issuing entity and different sub-periods. To our knowledge, there is no other study that 
shows how the direct and indirect effects impinge upon the issuing entity’s share prices. 
The empirical findings presented in this study support current policy and industrial initiatives 
designed to strengthen the securitization markets, improve the regulation of capital and foment 
greater responsibility and transparency with respect to securitization activity within Spanish 
banks and European banks in general. These measures should serve to overcome market frictions 
and to reestablish a certain confidence in the practice of securitization. In view of the results 
obtained here, it would seem that progress is being made in this direction given that the 
securitizations issued after July 2007 do not reflect an impact on share prices. 
Finally, it should be stated that this work has certain limitations derived from the elaboration of 
the data base using securitizations carried out in Spain which has lead us to use continuous stock 
market quotes and those of the fixed markets, and the cleansing of some of this data as a 
consequence of the confluence of different events. 
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Table 1.  Sample characteristics 
Distribution by years 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number 1  1 7 6 4 3 5 5 13 11 21 41 29 14 1 
Percentage 0.62  0.62 4.32 3.70 2.47 1.85 3.09 3.09 8.02 6.79 12.96 25.31 17.90 8.64 0.62 


































Percentage 0.10  0.15 0.43 1.13 0.56 1.14 2.25 2.25 7.02 6.58 14.11 27.63 24.46 11.44 0.73 
Distribution by type of collateral (Number) 
 199
5 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Mortgages 1  1 7 5 3 3 5 2 6 5 7 8 11 4 1 
Business loans     1 1   2 5 4 11 22 9 8  
Consumer credit         1 2 2 3 11 9 2  
Distribution by month 
 January February March April May June July August September October November December     
Number 4 9 12 14 22 20 12 2 19 25 12 11     
Percentage 2.47 5.56 7.41 8.64 13.58 12.35 7.41 1.23 11.73 15.43 7.41 6.79     
Distribution by bank 
  Number Percentage Total value of assets issued 
(Millions €) 
Mean value of assets issued 
(Millions €) 
       
Banco de Andalucía 7 4.32  1870.13   267.16         
Banco Español de Crédito 10 6.17  13694.00   1369.40         
Bankinter 23 14.20  24232.40   1053.58         
BBVA 26 16.05  58947.10   2267.19         
Banco de Castilla 6 3.70  760.31   126.71         
Banco de Crédito Balear 6 3.70  341.52   56.92         
Banco de Galicia 6 3.70  693.27   115.54         
Banco Guipuzcoano 13 8.02  3049.29   234.56         
Banco Pastor 11 6.79  6201.00   563.72         
Banco Popular Español 11 6.79  14678.92   1334.44         
Banco Sabadell 13 8.02  13780.00   1060.00         
Banco Santander 18 11.11  29530.59   1640.58         
Banco de Valencia 6 3.70  3342.30   557.05         
Banco de Vasconia 6 3.70  691.19   115.19         




Table 2. Variables and data sources 
Variable Description Data source 
Correlation (ρ) Correlation between the share i and the 
market. 
BME, authors’ calc. 
Relative standard deviation 
(REL_SD) 
Ratio of the standard deviation of the returns 
of the share i to standard deviation of the 
market return 
BME, authors’ calc. 
Z-Score (SOL) Ratio of the sum of equity capital to total 
assets and the ROAA to standard deviation of 
ROAA. 
BankScope, authors’ calc. 
ROAA Accounting value of a bank’s return on 
average assets before taxes. 
BankScope 
Capital ratio (K) Accounting value of a bank’s ratio of equity 
to total assets. 
BankScope 
SDROAA (𝜎) Standard deviation of a bank’s ROAA for a 




Extent of securitizations issued by a bank 
(millions €). 
CNMV, AIAF and securitization 
management companies’ web pages 
Net interest margin 
(Netintmargin) 
Proxy for the bank’s profitability. 
Accounting value of a bank’s net interest 
revenue as a share of its interest-bearing 




Proxy for the bank’s liquidity. Accounting 





Proxy for the bank’s asset quality. 
Accounting value of a bank’s non-
performing loans to gross loans. 
BankScope 
DMORT Dummy equal 1 for mortgage collateral, and 
equal 0 for other collateral 
 
 
